您書中（Washington’s China）講，從40到60年代，一開始美國政府把中國看做是當時蘇聯的“傀儡”，之後是中蘇集團中“獨立的小夥伴”，再後來是“革命典型”和第三世界動蕩的助推器。您認為，當前，美國政府把中國看成什麼？
我想基本上，美國對中國的主要擔憂來自於中國是一個極度獨立的國家，並一直在探索、追求屬於它自己的發展之路。現在，由於美國是超級大國這一本質，它對於別國的獨立發展非常敵視。撒奇爾夫人有句老話，“你別無選擇”。儘管美國政府偶爾會默許別國有其獨特的發展選擇，但大多數情況下，他們對此還是持批判、擔憂並敵視的態度。我想中國就是其中一個代表，不僅在獨立方面是一個代表，在那些把這個世界推向多極化的國家中，中國也是一個代表。越來越多的南部國家追求獨立，這對他們來説很不易，還有很長的發展之路要走，但是中國已經步入發展的正軌。但作為超級大國的美國對這些發展極其批判。
您反覆提到“hostility（敵意）”一詞，您筆下暗示美對中的敵意要遠高於中對美的敵意，為什麼是這樣？
當美國被指對中國採取的行動是由於敵視時，尤其是偏向美國政府的歷史學家總會説“可中國對美國也敵視”，並且這種情況從1949年後就一直出現。在1949年後，中國國內對於中美關係的走向確實也有很強烈的爭議。但是現實是，冷戰期間有很多關鍵時刻，比如在50年代的萬隆會議上，以及60年代的其他場合，中國政府明確地表示他們希望得到更多的承認，希望在聯合國有自己的一席之地，這些都被美國不公地拒絕了。在中國的各種聲明中，你隨便拿出來一篇，或者看看埃德加·斯諾在他人生不同階段對毛主席進行的採訪，或是周恩來和其他中國領導人的聲明，你會發現，中國才是一直希望對外開放的那個，而不是美國，並且直到尼克松和基辛格訪華，美國才開始開放。在越南戰爭時期，在美國民眾對美國政府的一片異見聲中，在遏制中國的政策讓越來越多美國人擔憂時，他們邁出了這一步。但在某種程度上，美國政府對中國的敵視依然存在，所以我剛提到了中國的獨立，真正的獨立讓美國敵視。但是正如我前面所講，這種敵視也表現在美國人充滿優越感和傲慢自大的語言、腔調上，舉另一個例子——美國偉大的非洲裔領袖馬丁·路德·金曾經説過，美國自大的本質在於他們相信，世界上任何其他國家都需要美國去教，而從其他國家那裏沒什麼可學。而我的想法是，如果美國不能從其他國家那裏學到知識，那麼他就不會和其他國家和諧相處，中國就是這些國家中重要的一個。
那您又如何看待“中國威脅論”？
從1945年成為超級大國後的美國政策可以看出，美國的信念就是它應該是全世界的支點，美國精神就是普世價值，並且最終，其他國家都要使自己適應于這一價值。美國在為自己説話，我想這是從外宣的角度，我認為根本上，普世價值並不能反映美國歷史，但是這一價值體現了美國的人文理想，如果其他國家不能踐行這一價值，就會被美國認為是欠合理的、欠發達的、缺少教養的、不精明的。
中國根據自己的國情，根據自己複雜的文化，長久以來一直在為獨立而奮鬥，獨立後的現在，長期努力探索社會轉型，以解決面臨的問題，比如如何讓個人生活更加美好、更有品質，如何處理污染問題。但是隨著中國的發展，它卻形成了非常不同於美國的發展之路，它不會成為美國效倣的對象，也不應該是，不能是。但是，找到適合自己的道路是非常艱辛的，這也啟發其他國家，不是去複製中國，而是找到屬於自己國家的發展之路。但這對於美國來説是個擔憂，因為這些國家追求一個多極世界，而美國不想支援這一追求，因為多極世界不能讓美國的權利得以發揮。
美國是一個超級大國，一個我們從未見過的超級大國，戰爭後的歷史原因讓它出世，這些原因包括其他大國被破壞。美國能大大重組日本和歐洲的經濟，所以這些國家依然默許美國政權對他們的干涉。他們會抱怨，他們會爭論，他們持異議，會擔心，但根本上，他們在某些方面依舊和美國綁在一起，同時也不安於南部國家的發展還要走多遠。中國是整個歷史環境中的一部分，存在中國本身的問題，也存在美國投射給中國的問題。
[Transcript]
I think basically the US’ main concern about China is that it is profoundly independent country that is seeking pursue its own means of development. Now the US, given the nature of its being a super power, has been very hostile to a range of independent kind of development. There is the old line that Margaret Thatcher used to use TINA-there is no alternative. And the American government though it appears at times to be acquiescent to alternative ways of developing. In most ways, it is very critical, uneasy and hostile to this. So I think what China now is representative of, its both independent in of itself, but it is also representative of those countries, forces in the world, that are moving towards a more multipolar world. And those countries in the south, that have not been able to emerge easily are increasingly doing so, it’s gonna be a long period of time as it develops, but China is on that historical trajectory I think. And the US, as a super power, is profoundly critical of these developments.
People often ,particularly historians in the US government, they always like to say when it’s pointed out that the US is hostile or takes acts that other people might consider hostile, “oh but the Chinese are hostile”. And this runs throughout the entire history of the relations since 1949. Now there were obviously very strong feeling in China after 1949 about the US relations would be. But in reality, there were key moments throughout the Cold War were there was a time that Bandung Conference in the 1950s, other moments in 1960s, when the Chinese government clearly signaled they were open to its recognition, they were open towards taking their seat in the UN, which have been so unjustly rejected by the US. So whatever one takes out some of the statements that came out of China, if you read many of Chairman Mao’s interviews with Edgar Snow at different time in his life, take some of the statements that Zhou Enlai and others made, you will see the Chinese were the ones who were willing to make the openings, not the US, and it was not until Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger took the step that they did, in the context one might note, of the Vietnam War, of huge public opposition in the US, growing uneasiness about the containment of China, that they took that step. But the hostility in a way still remains, and so I’ve mentioned it in terms what I think the independence is, true independences is about. But as I said earlier, it’s also there in the language; it’s there in the tone, and it’s there in a certain arrogance and as another example, the great African American leader Dr. Martin Luther King, used to say the essence of the American arrogance was the belief that it had everything to teach the world, and nothing to learn from it. The core of what I believe is if Americans can’t learn from the world of which China is such a critical part, they will not come to terms with that world.
I think if you look at what American policy is since 1945 as a super power, it’s a conviction that the US should be the pivot in every region of the world, that its ethos is universalistic one, and that other countries should ultimately adapt to aspects of that ethos. You know the US speaks for itself now, I think a propagandistic perception, I don’t think that is fundamentally what American history is about, but this vision of American and embodies humanities’ ideals, and other countries unless they live up to them somehow are to be judged as less legitimate or less developed, or less cultured, less sophisticated, and I think China is, by its size, its cultural sophistication, its long struggle to be independent, and now, within that independence, to figure out, having struggled so long to get it, what kind of society can deal with the problems they face, and those problems, everything from a better personal life, to get your quality, to dealing with pollution…But as China continues to develop, it is suggestive of a very different way of development to the US, its not gonna be a model of the US, it shouldn’t be, it can’t be.
